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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
cases, and the circumstances left little doubt as to the substantial
nature of the resulting injury to the sensibilities. Loss of bargain
sometimes offers a tangible basis upon which to estimate the
damages of mental suffering. In the instant case, however, it is
obvious the plaintiff was not suing for loss of the advantage of
witnessing the performance. His claim was for discourteous
treatment.
Although most courts prefer to seize upon the breach of' con-
tract idea or the public duty owed by the carrier or proprietor,
several cases have proceeded more directly to the point. The
courts in such cases often resort to such terms as "improper
expulsion," 19 or "wrongful acts ' 20 or "wanton or shamefully gross
wrong, 12 1 offering no clue as to what is improper or wrongful. In
one Louisiana case 22 similar to the present controversy, recovery
was allowed without reference to any theory whatsoever. These
decisions, although difficult to align with established torts doc-
trines, indicate nevertheless that here is an independent wrong
which is on the way to achieving open recognition. Few decisions
in the history of torts law have directly announced the advent on
first trial of a complete new doctrine with boundaries fully
defined. Usually the process is one of slow and cautious growth.
Hence vagueness and uncertainty in these opinions is to be
expected.
In conclusion it might be questioned whether the plaintiff
in the instant case sustained any appreciable injury. The de-
defendant was seeking to enforce a rule for the safety of his
patrons, and the reported evidence that his conduct was excessive
was meagre at best. The law cannot effectively protect overacute
sensibilities without disregard of the hard actualities of modern
living. On the facts as given it may be suggested that the court
has overshot the mark.
JOHN C. MORRIS, JR.
PARENT AND CHILD-LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR MISUSE OF AIR
RIFLE BY CHILD-DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES-Defendant's son,
a boy of about ten years of age, fired at a target with an air rifle
which he had borrowed from a friend. The shot ricocheted and
19. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911).
20. Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
21. Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938).
22. Planchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theatres Co., 166 La. 235,
117 So. 132 (1928).
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injured the eye of plaintiff's son. The facts reveal no carelessness
on the part either of the defendant or his son, and it appeared
that the latter was one of the few boys in the neighborhood who
had not been permitted to use such a weapon. On appeal it was
held that the defendant was liable for the damages inflicted by
virtue of Article 2318 of the Civil Code, which provides that a
parent is liable for the torts of his child. The court overrode the
objection that there was no evidence of negligence by falling
back on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Phillips v.
D'Amico, 21 So. (2d) 748 (La. 1945).
The above article of the Civil Code has been uniformly inter-
preted in this state as imposing liability on the parent for the
torts of a minor child without respect to any notion of fault on
the part of the parent or an agency relationship between the
parent and the child.1 This article is generally regarded as an
innovation and differs from the corresponding article of the Code
Napoleon as well as the common law. The idea behind the article
as so interpreted appears to be that the parent's solvency should
stand behind the wrongdoings of his dependent children. In
interesting contrast, Louisiana law does not hold the husband
for the torts of the wife when she is on a mission for her sepa-
rate interest, 2 although it is otherwise when she is acting on
behalf of the community of husband and wife.' This discrepancy
in attitude toward the liability of the head of the family for the
torts of the respective members of the family, although it is con-
sistent with the code provisions involved, nevertheless reveals
an uncertainty as to what purpose underlies the liability of the
family head.
In common law jurisdictions, the search for a solvent de-
fendant behind the wrongdoing of the dependent members of
the family has been intensified with the advent of the family
automobile. There is a growing idea that the solvent family head
should bear the loss for the injuries tortiously inflicted by those
members of the family who are dependent upon him. This idea
1. Notes (1931) 5 Tulane L. Rev. 644, (1933) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 119. Cleave-
land v. Mayo, 19 La. 414 (1841) (parent responsible for the neglect on the
ground that, through his control of the child, he could have prevented the
act); Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1895); Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93
So. 108 (1921) (birth gives rise to paternal control and authority over a
child, and paternal responsibility for the torts of a child is the consequence
and offspring of the paternal authority).
2. Chauviere v. Fliege, 6 La. Ann. 56 (1851); Matulich v. Crockett, 184
So. 748 (La. App. 1938); Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 857 (La. App. 1939).
3. Reaneau v. Brown, 9 La. App. 375, 158 So. 406 (1928); Adams v. Gol-
son, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
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has found expression in the common law, which, although it
proceeds on the basic premise that the parent and husband are
not liable for the torts of the child or wife, has nevertheless
managed to impose liability in a substantial number of cases
through indirection. The devices used are several; two notions
particularly have been seized upon by the courts. First, if an
agency relationship obtains between parent and child, and the
wrong committed by the child can be attributed to that relation-
ship, liability will be imposed.4 The same is true, of course, with
respect to husband and wife. In recent years the courts have
tended to manipulate and even distort traditional agency con-
ceptions within the family unit in order to impose the much
desired liability upon the head of the family. The outstanding
example of this perversion of the usual agency relationship is the
so-called family purpose doctrine, which makes the head of the
family liable for any negligently inflicted injuries occasioned
through the use of the family automobile. Another device which
has been resorted to in order to reach the solvent family head is
the accepted notion that the parent is liable for the torts of his
children, if the parent was guilty of any personal fault which
contributed to the injury. Common law courts have adopted
a very liberal attitude with respect to the concept of fault in these
cases and have succeeded in imposing liability in many situa-
tions where moral blameworthiness is in fact difficult to discover.8
4. Smith v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N.E. 761 (1912) (authority of a
father to son to do an act which resulted in injury to a third person may
be derived from the father's actual presence, or from his express or implied
direction, or from a precedent course of conduct); Broadstreet v. Hall, 168
Ind. 192, 80 N.E. 145 (1907); Napier v. Patterson, 198 Iowa 257, 196 N.W.
73 (1923); Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919).
5. Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915); Rufferford v. Smith, 284
Ky. 592, 145 S.W. (2d) 533 (1940) (grandmother held liable under the "family
purpose doctrine" for grandson's negligent operation of automobile); Griffin
v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915); McNeal v. McKain, 33 Okla. 449,
126 Pac. 742 (1912); Davis v. Littlefleld, 97 S.C. 171, 81 S.E. 487 (1914) (parent
held liable for negligence of son when son driving for pleasure). See Brodsky,
Motor Vehicle Owners' Statutory Vicarious Liability In Rhode Island (1939)
19 Boston U. L. Rev. 448; Chamberlain, Automobile and Vicarious Liability
(1924); Notes (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 782; (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 513; (1933)
81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 60; (1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 823. Constitutionality upheld
in Robinson v. Rent-A-Ford Co., 205 Iowa 261, 215 N.W. 724 (1927).
6. Graham v. Page, 300 Ill. 40, 132 N.E. 817 (1921) (minor daughter
using father's automobile to bring his shoes from repair shop, held to be
his agent); Stewart v. Swartz, 57 Ind. App. 249, 106 N.E. 719 (1914) (where
a parent knew, several days before the accident, that his minor children
had stretched a rope across a highway, and a traveler was injured thereby,
the parent was liable); Schaefer v. Osterbrook, 67 Wis. 495, 502, 30 N.W.
922, 926 (1886) (where the court said: ". . . the burden to show that his son
was not his servant Is Imposed upon the father"); Hiroux v. Baum, 137 Wis.
NOTES
A comparison of the results reached at common law and
under the Louisiana decisions leads to the conclusion that under
both systems the parent is likely to be held. The primary differ-
ence seems to be in the method of attack.7 The Louisiana courts
proceed directly to the conclusion that the parent is liable, while
the common law courts reach similar results by engrafting
numerous exceptions onto an initial rule of no liability. With
respect to the liability of the husband for torts of the wife, the
results under both systems are more uneven. The Louisiana
courts make the matter hinge on the fact that the wife was en-
gaged on a community mission, while the common law jurisdic-
tions either rely upon the family purpose doctrine or deny lia-
bility altogether.
In the instant case the court admitted that the codal article
relied upon could not fairly be interpreted as imposing liability
in the absence of a showing of fault upon the part either of the
parent or the child. It took the position, however, that the use
of an air gun in a congested urban district imposes so high a de-
gree of care that the user would be liable unless "there was no
reasonable possibility that the bullets might strike anyone who
might be nearby.8 Thus a virtual insurer's liability is placed
upon the juvenile user of such a weapon, which, in turn, is re-
flected back upon the entirely innocent parent. Perhaps the
decision will have a salutary effect upon the safety of urban
areas. It comports with the general tendency of courts every-
where to discuss cases involving injuries by firearms in terms of
negligence, but at the same time to so weight the case against
the defendant that he has little chance of escaping liability.9
Under the facts presented, however, common law courts would
197, 118 N.W. 533 (1908) (one who is running an automobile at the time of
a collision with a. person in the street is prima facie the servant of the
automobile); ZeidIer v. Goelzer, 191 Wis. 378, 211 N.E. 104 (1926).
7. Louisiana has been severely criticized for holding parents liable who
are not at fault for the tort of their child. An example is this quotation
from Note (1934) 19 Corn. L. Q. 643: "It is difficult to see how recurrence of
harm will be prevented by imposing an absolute liability on a parent who
could not have prevented the act complained of. The rule seems quite as
likely to foster birth control." Ritter v. Thibodeaux, 41 S.W. 492 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1897): "Such a case would have been upheld by the civil law, under
the operation of which the child occupied the position almost of a slave .....
The absurdity of these statements are a sufficient refutation.
8. Phillips v. D'Amico, 21 So. (2d) 748, 751 (La. 1945).
9. See the excellent discussion in Inbau, Firearms and Legal Doctrine




encounter great difficulty in translating the son's technical wrong
into a responsibility to be shouldered by the parent.'0
WADE H. DAVIS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RIGHT OF UNACKNOWLEDGED ILLE-
GITIMATE CHILDREN TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS-The father of two ille-
gitimate children was killed while in the defendant's employ.
Plaintiff, mother and tutrix of the minor children of this union,
sued for damages and in the alternative for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The supreme court on first
hearing disallowed the claim for damages, ruling that Article
2315 of the Revised Civil Code applied only to legitimate children.
The claim to compensation was not allowed as the children had
not been formally acknowledged in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 203 of the Revised Civil Code as required by the
Workmen's Compensation Act.- Upon rehearing the court re-
versed its previous stand and allowed compensation benefits to
the children, though not formally acknowledged, because they
were dependent upon the deceased for support. Thompson v.
Vestal Lumber & Manufacturing Company, 22 So. (2d) 842 (La.
1945).
Obviously the decision in this case is not in accordance with
a strict interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Sec-
tion 8, Subsection 2 (H), of the act specifically provides that the
term "child" or "children" shall cover illegitimate children ac-
knowledged under the provisions of Civil Code Articles 203, 204,
and 205. Hitherto, the court has followed the strict letter of these
provisions.2 The provisions of Section 8, Subsection 2 (D) do not
seem to have been mentioned by the court or used in any way
to justify the rights of illegitimate children. Hence the prior
jurisprudence has steadfastly denied the right of illegitimates,
unacknowledged according to the provisions of Article 203 of the
10. Compare Sullivan v. Creed (1904) Ir. R. 1025 with Swanson v. Cran-
dall, 2 Pa. Super. 85 (1896). Shearman and Redfleld, A Treatise on the Law
of Negligence (rev. ed. 1941) § 761.
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(2) (H), as amended by La. Act 242 of 1928 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4398J.
2. Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., Ltd., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920);
Lillian Gullung v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 1 La. App. 147 (1924); Wells v. White-
Grandin Lbr. Co., Inc., 13 La. App. 696, 129 So. 171 (1930); Stewart v. Parish
of Jefferson Davis, 17 La. App. 626, 136 So. 659 (1931); Barranco v. Davis,
175 La. 35, 142 So. 844 (1932); Beard v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 185 La. 55,
168 So. 492 (1936).
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